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NONCOMPETE AGREEMENTS UNDER FLORIDA LAW:
A RETROSPECTIVE AND A REQUIEM?
KENDALL B. COFFEY* & THOMAS F. NEALON, III**
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE subject of the enforceability of an employee's covenant not to
compete against a former employer has undergone a substantial
evolution.' Reversing the momentum of a decade of increasingly rigid
appellate enforcement, in 1990 the Florida Legislature amended sec-
tion 542.33, Florida Statutes,2 arguably restoring a level playing field
to what, in many respects, had become a matter of "no contest." For
some observers, this legislative enactment has taken the heart out of
the express statutory authorization for the enforcement of covenants
not to compete found in section 542.33. Others may proclaim that
Florida has merely adopted a reasonable approach to the issue of en-
forcement of noncompete covenants, which places it more in line with
other jurisdictions. Whatever the perspective, it is undeniable that the
1990 amendment has wrought dramatic change to an area of the law
once dominated by the robotics of simplistic enforcement.
In addressing the evolution and current state of noncompetition
agreements, this Article initially analyzes the key developments in the
case law concerning section 542.33 since its enactment in 1953, with
particular emphasis on the past decade. This is done to fully develop
the backdrop against which the true impact of the 1990 amendment
can be best perceived and assessed. In many respects, this case law
provided the impetus for the 1990 legislative revision. The Article next
explores the various statutory revisions to section 542.33 before 1990.
After developing this background analysis, the focus turns to the cur-
rent status of section 542.33 and likely developments and potential ar-
eas of conflict in the aftermath of the 1990 amendment. Finally, this
Article concludes with a summary and recommendation for dealing
* Partner, Coffey, Aragon, Martin, and Burlington, P.A., Miami, Florida; B.S., 1975;
J.D., 1978, University of Florida.
** Sole practitioner, Miami, Florida; A.B., 1970; J.D., 1974, Georgetown University.
1. This Article updates an Article covering the same subject published in 1980. Kendall B.
Coffey, Noncompete Agreements By the Former Employee: A Florida Law Survey and Analysis,
8 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 727 (1980).
2. Ch. 90-216, 1990 Fla. Laws 1607 (amending FLA. STAT. § 542.33(2)(a) (1989)).
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with future questions concerning the use and enforcement of cove-
nants by employees not to compete against their former employers.
II. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
For many years, Florida exhibited extreme distaste, if not outright
opposition, toward covenants not to compete in the employment con-
text. While affording occasional vindication to such restrictions when
agreed to by sellers of businesses, Florida courts routinely voided such
noncompetition agreements in employment cases, generally on the
ground that they contravened public policy.3 Underlying this judicial
antipathy was a range of social and equitable concerns that the courts
typically resolved in favor of the employee. 4 This judicial antagonism
toward noncompetition agreements against former employees reached
a high point in the mid-1950s when the Florida Supreme Court ob-
served that "[w]e have found no case nor have we been cited to one
where a contract of employment with provision not to compete or
work for a competitor has been upheld in this jurisdiction." 5 Some-
what paradoxically, the court further noted that "[s]uch contracts will
not be enforced, absent some special equity, and have generally been
stricken down for 'lack of mutuality.' ' 6 This sentiment had its roots
in the long-standing common law principle that contracts in restraint
of trade that deprived the public of one's skill or industry and that
3. Love v. Miami Laundry Co., 160 So. 32 (Fla. 1934). This case was in accord with the
general sentiment of the time concerning such covenants, expressed in Super Maid Cook-Ware
Corp. v. Hamil, 50 F.2d 830, 831 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 677 (1931). In Hamil, the
court affirmed the denial of an injunction to enforce two restrictive covenants, noting: "For,
fundamentally, in and of themselves these covenants are in restraint of trade, and unenforceable.
It is a settled principle of law that no man may, per se, contract with another that that other will
not follow a calling by which he may make his livelihood." Id.
4. In Love, the Florida Supreme Court best summarized this judicial aversion as follows:
"[T]he enforcement of this provision of the contract may, and in all probability will, mean that
the contracting employee cannot procure other employment, and that he, together with his fam-
ily, will become a charge on the public." 160 So. at 34. The court also stated "that courts are
reluctant to uphold contracts whereby an individual restricts his right to earn a living at his
chosen calling is well established." Id. In many respects, with the 1990 amendment to § 542.33,
we have come full circle regarding such concerns, as will be discussed infra in the text accompa-
nying notes 194-212.
5. Arond v. Grossman, 75 So. 2d 593, 595 (Fla. 1954) (This case arose before the effective
date of Florida's noncompetition statute.).
6. Id. In contrast, it is relevant to note Justice Drew's dissenting opinion in the case of
United Loan Corp. v. Weddle, 77 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1955), where the Florida Supreme Court
affirmed the denial of injunctive relief based upon Love. Justice Drew, in his dissent, sought to
distinguish Weddle from Love based upon a mutuality/arms-length contractual argument be-
cause the employee in Weddle had "considerable experience and business ability" and had vol-
untarily agreed to restrictions "without any coercion and for his own benefit." Id. at 631.
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prevented one from supporting oneself and one's family were invalid
as against public policy. 7
In 1953, the dynamics of confrontations between employee and em-
ployer were radically altered by the Florida Legislature's passage of a
statute authorizing the enforcement of noncompetition agreements
against former employers under certain circumstances.' For employers
confronting the traditional common law enmity toward such agree-
ments, this statute provided a mechanism to protect their legitimate
business interests. Thus, the first section of the statute defined its
starting point with homage to the longstanding hostility to noncompe-
tition agreements: "(1) Every contract by which anyone is restrained
from exercising a lawful profession, trade or business of any kind,
otherwise than is provided by subsections (2) and (3) hereof, is to that
extent void." 9 The Legislature next proceeded to carve out a specific
exemption from this general prohibition in subsection (2):10
[O]ne who is employed as an agent or employee may agree with his
employer, to refrain from carrying on or engaging in a similar
business and from soliciting old customers of such employer within a
7. Oregon Steam Navigation Co. v. Winsor, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 64, 68 (1874). The Florida
Supreme Court in Standard Newspapers, Inc. v. Woods, 110 So. 2d 397, 399 (Fla. 1959), sum-
marized this doctrine as follows:
Originally, under the common law of England, contracts restricting a man's right to
follow his calling were considered void as against public policy. This view developed
from the requirement that a man could not pursue a trade to which he had not become
apprenticed, and that one so committed was subject to penalty if he did not exercise
that trade. Consequently an agreement to restrain him from following his trade would
result either in his violation of the law or the deprivation of his right to earn a liveli-
hood.
Id.
8. FLA. STAT. § 542.12 (1953). Subsequently, effective October 1, 1980, § 542.12 was re-
numbered § 542.33. Ch. 80-28, 1980 Fla. Laws 95. For purposes of consistency and in order to
avoid confusion, all references in the text of this Article will be to § 542.33, unless otherwise
indicated, and all references to § 542.12 cited in the various cases shall be deemed to be refer-
ences to § 542.33.
9. FLA. STAT. § 542.12(1) (1953). Effective October 1, 1988, the Florida Legislature en-
acted certain revisions to § 542.33. In particular, subsection (1) was rewritten as follows:
(1) Notwithstanding other provisions of this chapter to the contrary, each contract by
which any person is restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade, or business
of any kind, as provided by subsections (2) and (3) hereof, is to that extent valid, and
all other contracts in restraint of trade are void.
FLA. STAT. § 542.33(1) (1988). This amendment is discussed infra in the text accompanying notes
175-77.
10. FLA. STAT. § 542.12(2) (1953). This section was amended to add the term "independent
contractor." Ch. 87-40, 1987 Fla. Laws 176. The importance of this revision is discussed infra in
part VB of this Article.
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reasonably limited time and area, . . so long as such employer
continues to carry on a like business therein."
This statute was upheld as applied to noncompetition agreements
between employers and employees in Capelouto v. Orkin Exterminat-
ing Co.' 2 Noting the absence of "any overriding public interest in hav-
ing the restricted employee's services available to it,"' 3 the court
upheld a two-year restrictive covenant covering the multi-county area
managed by the former employee. Capelouto was to become a water-
shed opinion spawning jurisprudence establishing that section
542.33(2) "clearly supersedes the common-law rule" and has become
"the controlling law within its proper sphere of operation.' 14
Beginning with the Atlas Travel Service decision, the Florida courts
began to weave distinct threads of legal reasoning around attempts to
define the scope and limitations of section 542.33. The decision in At-
las noted that the trial court's exercise of its discretion regarding in-
junctive relief "shall be reasonably exercised to the end that the object
of the statute may not be nullified," so long as the court avoids a
result that is "harsh, oppressive or unjust."'" This demonstrated the
early dichotomy that existed between judicial duty to enforce these
agreements in the aftermath of a legislative mandate and the antipathy
the courts had long expressed toward restrictions on the individual's
ability to earn a livelihood. Through subsequent judicial action,
though, this early divergence yielded to a pendulum swing favoring
noncompetition agreements. Throughout this atmosphere of endorse-
ment, the scope of judicial review narrowed for issues customarily
raised by enforcement actions involving noncompetition agreements. 6
That evolution culminated in the enactment of the 1990 amendment to
section 542.33.
11. FLA. STAT. § 542.12(2) (1953). In Standard Newspapers, the court specifically rejected
arguments that the statute was unconstitutional and violated due process by depriving a person
of his or her livelihood. It should be noted that this case arose in the context of the sale of a
business and, therefore, was governed by the first sentence of § 542.12(2) dealing with "one who
sells the goodwill of a business." 110 So. 2d at 400.
12. 183 So. 2d 532 (Fla.), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 11 (1966). The court ruled that "there
can be no doubt that the legislature of our state has the power to enact legislation superseding
the common law as it did by enactment of Section 542.12, and more specifically by the enact-
ment of subsections (2) and (3) thereof." Id. at 534.
13. Id. at 534.
14. Atlas Travel Serv. v. Morelly, 98 So. 2d 816, 818 (Fla. 1st DCA 1957).
15. Id. See also Capelouto, 183 So. 2d at 532, where similar concerns regarding the balanc-
ing of the various interests involved were expressed.
16. In part III of this Article we discuss this narrowing process and the role it may have
played in prompting the 1990 amendment to section 542.33.
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III. STATUTORY FRAmEwoRK
The legal framework for noncompetition agreements in Florida
does not provide a specific affirmative statutory authorization but, in
contrast, validates the agreements through an exception to a general
prohibition against trade restraints. This is reflective of the public pol-
icy suspicions Florida had, at least at the outset, for such agreements.
The Florida Supreme Court perhaps best summarized this public pol-
icy consideration in 1971 :17
The pertinent question is whether the contract in effect impedes or
restrains a former employee from exercising his lawful profession,
trade or business. If a contract has this effect, it violates public
policy as announced through the statute, unless it conforms to the
statutory requirements of reasonable limitation as to time and area."
In this context, at least initially, the courts frequently construed non-
competition agreements narrowly in order to avoid enforcement. 9
Generally, courts took the position that unless the restrictive cove-
nants were encompassed within the "savings" provision of section
542.33, they would be void.2°
A. Carrying On Business
The early case law concerning section 542.33 served to clarify any
confusion regarding terminology contained in that section. Relatively
easily, the courts resolved any question regarding the interpretation of
the phrase "carrying on or engaging in a similar business" found in
section 542.33(2). In Storz Broadcasting Co. v. Courtney,2' the Third
District Court of Appeal stated: "[I]t is now established that accept-
ing employment in a similar business falls within the term 'engaging in
a similar business' as used in the statute, and therefore is within the
17. Flammer v. Patton, 245 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 1971).
18. Id. at 858.
19. E.g., Storz Broadcasting Co. v. Courtney, 178 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965). In Storz,
the court held the restriction was unenforceable "because the covenant not to compete related to
termination of employment during the term and was not applicable after the employment con-
tract was fully performed." Id. at 42.
20. E.g., Cerniglia v. C. & D. Farms, Inc., 203 So. 2d I (Fla. 1967) (contract unenforceable
because it is repugnant to our public policy); Bergh v. Stephens, 175 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 1st DCA
1965) (The inclusion of the term "business" and the omission of the term "profession" from
subsection (2) of § 542.33 indicated that it was not applicable to professions, and since the pro-
fession of medicine is not encompassed by the term "business," a covenant by a doctor, there-
fore, fell outside the statute and was unenforceable.).
21. 178 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965).
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exceptions stated in § 542.12(2)."22 The Fourth District Court of Ap-
peal likewise had little difficulty concluding that accepting a different
position with a competitor than that held with the former employer
did not preclude enforcement of the noncompetition agreement.2
Similarly, the Second District Court of Appeal rejected the argument
that section 542.33(2) "applies only to one who leaves his employment
and subsequently becomes an owner or proprietor of his own busi-
ness."24
B. "One Who Is Employed" and Independent Contractors
Another area of potential controversy surrounded interpretation of
the term "one who is employed." The initial version of section
542.33(2)(a) referred to "one who is employed as an agent or em-
ployee." This gave rise to some question as to the applicability of
542.33 to independent contractors. In order to resolve this confusion,
the courts resorted to principles of agency to analyze whether the for-
mer employer exerted sufficient control over the individual to bring
him or her within the parameters of section 542.33. In Economic Re-
search Analysts, Inc. v. Brennan,25 the Fourth District Court of Ap-
peal rejected arguments by the defendant that he was not "employed"
as required by section 542.33(2), but was merely an independent bro-
ker and, therefore, was outside the ambit of section 542.33. Reversing
the trial court's dismissal of the complaint, the court found that the
plaintiff had asserted sufficient control over the defendant to establish
an agency relationship that made the defendant "an agent of appel-
lant within the meaning of subsection (2) of Section 542.12."26
The Fifth District Court of Appeal reached a similar conclusion in
Insurance Field Services, Inc. v. White & White Inspection,27 overrul-
ing the trial court's determination that the defendant was an inde-
pendent contractor. 28 The facts of this case presented egregious
conduct constituting tortious interference with a business relationship,
22. Id. at 42.
23. Hunter v. North Am. Biologicals, Inc., 287 So. 2d 726, 728 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974).
24. Fogle v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 168 So. 2d 153, 154 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964).
25. 232 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970). The court was not influenced by the fact that the
agreement expressly provided that the relationship of employer and employee did not exist.
26. Id. at 221. The court, in explaining this finding, noted: "Appellant was required by law
to supervise the conduct of appellee [defendant]," and "the appellee [defendant] was registered
with the Florida Securities Commission as a registered agent or salesman for appellant." Id.
27. 384 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
28. This Article revisits the topic of "independent contractor" during its examination and
review of legislative developments since 1980. See infra in part VB.
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which may have influenced the court's analysis and decision.29 Less
problematic was the question of whether a company's officer was an
"employee" for purposes of section 542.33 and therefore was bound
by the terms of a noncompetition agreement. 0
Conversely, two decisions by the Second District Court of Appeal
in 1985 departed from the foregoing analysis, breaking new ground
with respect to the issue of "independent contractor" versus "agent/
employee." In Ware v. Money-Plan International, Inc.,31 the court re-
versed the trial court's decision granting injunctive relief solely on its
finding that the defendants/appellants were independent contractors
and not agents or employees. 2 The court specifically distinguished
Ware from Brennan.3 3 Similarly, in Lenox v. Sound Entertainment,
Inc. ,34 the court, relying on its decision in Ware, reversed the trial
court's order granting an injunction exclusively on the finding "that
Lenox was an independent contractor," and therefore the covenant
not to compete violated section 542.33 . 5
This line of cases culminated with the decision Amedas, Inc. v.
Brown.16 In Amedas, the Second District Court of Appeal narrowly
construed the term "agent" and held that those who were character-
ized as "independent contractors" could not be deemed to be
"agents" for purposes of section 542.33.17 The court found that the
agreement between Brown and Amedas referred to Brown as an inde-
pendent contractor, and the work arrangement supported this charac-
terization in holding the noncompetition clause unenforceable."
C. Businesses and Professions
A related issue concerned the distinction, if any, for purposes of
section 542.33 between a "business" and a "profession." For a brief
period there was some judicial sentiment endorsing a distinction be-
tween the two terms. In Bergh v. Stephens,3 9 the First District Court
of Appeal noted: "[L]ike the legal profession, the medical profession
29. 384 So. 2d at 306.
30. Brenner v. Barco Chem. Div., Inc., 209 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968).
31. 467 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985).
32. Id. at 1075.
33. Id. at 1074.
34. 470 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985).
35. Id. at 79.
36. 505 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987).
37. Id. at 1092. It should be noted, however, that the Second District Court of Appeal did
remand the case to the trial court to consider whether Brown had breached his contract with
Amedas or had tortiously interfered with Amedas' contractual relations. Id. at 1093.
38. Id.
39. 175 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965).
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has for centuries been regarded and adjudicated to be a great and no-
ble profession, as distinguished from a business, and it is so today.'' 4
This distinction was not recognized by all courts who considered the
issue.4' Any lingering doubt on this issue was conclusively resolved by
the Florida Supreme Court in 1970 in Akey v. Murphy.42 The supreme
court, in reversing the Second District Court of Appeal's decision
based upon Bergh v. Stephens, interred any such argument saying:
No real distinction between business partners associated together for
the practicing of a trade or profession and those engaged in a
'business' such as the sale of groceries ... is immediately apparent,
insofar as the public policy in question is concerned. 43
IV. JUDICLAL EVOLUTION
A. Whether "Unreasonable" Agreements Are Within the Scope of
Section 542.33
The reasonableness of the nature, scope, and duration of the non-
competition agreement has been one of the most litigated issues raised
by section 542.33.4 As discussed previously, because such agreements
are in derogation of the common law, they must be strictly construed
and enforced. Applying this principle, several early decisions held that
the provisions of the noncompetition agreement were unreasonably
broad and, therefore, outside the savings provision of section 542.33,
and thus wholly void.45 The most significant holding to support the
premise that unreasonable arguments are to be discarded in their en-
tirety was the decision rendered by the Florida Supreme Court in 1967
40. Id. at 791.
41. See White v. Allen, 232 So. 2d 766 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970) (holding that the term "busi-
ness" as used in § 542.33 includes a profession or trade).
42. 238 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 1970) (restriction covered an area within 30 miles of Lakeland for a
period of two years).
43. Id. at 96.
44. The concept of unreasonableness has played a pivotal role in the development of the
law concerning the enforcement of noncompetition agreements. In addition to arising under the
heading of the general unreasonableness of the restriction, these covenants have been hotly liti-
gated with respect to questions of reasonableness as to the time and the geographic area of the
covenant. More recently, with the 1990 amendment to § 542.33, it has again assumed center
stage as one of the key issues that a court must consider and resolve before enforcement. This
Article investigates and analyzes each of these areas.
45. See, e.g., Forrest v. Kornblatt, 328 So. 2d 528, 529 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) (The court
noted that under Florida law the trial judge must exercise sound judicial judgment and that
"[this record does not show an abuse of discretion under the circumstances of this case.");
Sanford Indus. v. Jaghory, 223 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969); C & D Farms, Inc. v. Cerniglia,
189 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966), aff'd in part and remanded in part, 203 So. 2d I (Fla. 1967).
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in Cerniglia v. C. & D. Farms, Inc. 46 In a case involving a restrictive
covenant signed by a former owner in favor of the purchaser of a
business, the court, without comment or explanation, upheld the trial
court's finding that the contract was unenforceable as against public
policy because it was "too extensive, both as to time and area.' '47 It
should be noted, however, that the time restriction in Cerniglia cov-
ered a twenty-year period, and the area restricted encompassed the en-
tire United States.
For whatever reason, the Cerniglia doctrine of wholesale invalida-
tion attracted little following in subsequent years. Shortly after its de-
cision in Cerniglia, the Florida Supreme Court, in Flammer v.
Patton,4 clarified the analysis governing the question of reasonable-
ness for noncompetition agreements by mandating judicial modifica-
tion, rather than nullification, of unreasonable agreements.
On its face, Flammer appeared to set forth the perfect factual back-
ground for the extension of the proposition established by the court in
Cerniglia. Flammer had retired after thirty-three years of service with
Beneficial Finance Company. 49 At the time of his retirement, he was
eligible for monthly pension benefits of $256.38 under the company's
employees' pension and death benefit plan.50 The plan included a pro-
vision that gave plan trustees authority to terminate, discontinue, or
suspend any payment under the plan if an employee or retired em-
ployee engaged in a business or occupation in competition with the
company.5' When Flammer joined the National Bank of Tampa as a
loan officer several months after his retirement, the trustees notified
him that his benefits would be suspended. 52 The circuit court upheld
the noncompetition provision and the district court of appeal af-
firmed, notwithstanding the apparent harshness of the result. 53
The supreme court began its analysis by discussing the historical
hostility of courts to restraints upon former employees. After briefly
46. 203 So. 2d I (Fla. 1967). The supreme court deferred to the discretion of the trial court.
47. Id. at 2.
48. 245 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 1971).
49. Id. at 855.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 856. The plan provision in question contained no limitation as to either time or
geographic area for the alleged competition, but rather left that issue entirely to the discretion of
the plan trustees.
52. Id. Flammer's benefits were suspended from December 1, 1965, until September 1,
1969, when they were reinstated following his resignation from the bank. No back payments
were allowed by the trustees of the plan. Id.
53. Id.
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reviewing the Florida Legislature's response in enacting section
542.33, the court reasoned:
The pertinent question is whether the contract in effect impedes or
restrains a former employee from exercising his lawful profession,
trade or business. If a contract has this effect, it violates public
policy as announced through the statute, unless it conforms to the
statutory requirements of reasonable limitation as to time and area.14
Applying this rationale, the court swept aside the contention that the
elimination of retirement benefits as a penalty for competing does not
restrain trade:
We find it indefensible for respondents to contend that petitioner
was free to accept any employment he chose, so long as he was
willing to surrender the benefits earned as a result of more than
thirty years' service to Beneficial. What greater restraint can there be
on a retiree than the spector of withheld pension benefits?"5
Notwithstanding the court's conclusion that cutting off Flammer's
retirement benefits could be a restraint on trade, the court agreed that
it was nevertheless within the scope of section 542.33. To fashion a
resolution to the controversy, the court adopted a middle-ground po-
sition, interpreting the statute to mean that "in the instant case, res-
trictions on the receipt of pension benefits would be permissible, so
long as the restrictions were reasonably limited as to time and area."56
Thus, rather than consigning facially unreasonable agreements to the
nearest paper shredder, the court issued a broad judicial mandate to
trial courts to exercise their discretionary authority. The court held
that "[w]here no limitations are contained in the restrictions it is
within the discretion of the trial court to determine what limitations as
54. Id. at 858. In response to the question of whether § 542.33 embraced noncompetition
provisions in pension plans, the court, while noting that the statute provided no definition for a
"contract by which anyone is restrained," concluded that "the breadth of the statutory language
clearly implies a wide range of applicability." Id. at 857. See Herndon v. Eli Witt Co., 420 So.
2d 920 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), where the court upheld the provisions of a covenant not to compete
included in a settlement agreement entered into by the parties after their employer/employee
relationship had terminated. While noting that the language of 542.33(2)(a) was intended to ap-
ply to agreements entered into during the course of the employment relationship, the court con-
cluded that "under the circumstances [described], considerations of public policy, equity and
fair dealing favor enforcement of the covenant if it is otherwise reasonable." Id. at 923. See also
Pensacola Assoc. v. Briggs Sporting Goods Co., 353 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (The court
held that a covenant not to compete included in provisions of lease did not violate § 542.33(1).).
55. 245 So. 2d at 858.
56. Id. at 859.
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to time and area would be reasonable under the circumstances. '57
Flammer's progeny have consistently held that agreements that are
unreasonable in matters of time and area are curable through the exer-
cise of judicial discretion."
B. Resolving the Questions of "Reasonableness" as to Time and
Area
In 1974, the Florida Supreme Court continued to endorse a proac-
tive role for trial judges when, in Miller Mechanical, Inc. v. Ruth,5 9
the court reversed a denial of injunctive relief and ruled that the trial
court should have determined a reasonable length of time for the re-
striction and granted an injunction for that period.60 In so doing, the
court ruled that the trial court may have to assume the role of drafts-
man to modify and, in effect, rewrite unreasonable covenants. The
court stated: "[I]n the event a trial court finds the provisions of the
agreement to be unreasonable, the correct procedure would be for the
Court to modify the agreement and award an appropriate remedy." ' 61
As later decisions demonstrated, though, this holding did not give
trial court judges blanket authority to totally rewrite otherwise reason-
able agreements. In Twenty Four Collection, Inc. v. Keller,6 the trial
court rejected a two-year, three-county noncompetition agreement
and fashioned its own restriction, which restrained Ms. Keller from
dealing with several named suppliers of Twenty Four Collection, Inc.,
with whom she had developed personal relationships, or with any of
its former customers.63 The Third District Court of Appeal reversed
57. Id.
58. See Miller Mechanical, Inc. v. Ruth, 300 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 1974).
59. In Miller, the trial court found that the contract was valid, but the three-year covenant
not to compete was unreasonable as to length of time. The trial court, therefore, refused to
enforce the contract by way of an injunction and instead awarded nominal damages. 300 So. 2d
at 12.
60. Id. at 13. Compare with Auto Club Affiliates, Inc. v. Donahey, 281 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1973) (reversing the denial of injunctive relief). In Auto Club Affiliates, the court, com-
menting on the lack of an area restriction in the covenant, ruled: "A covenant which lacks a
territorial limitation is not void ipso facto as long as the absence of the territorial limitation can
be shown to be reasonable under the circumstances." Id. at 243 (citations omitted). The court
remanded the case to the trial court for such a determination. In Joseph U. Moore, Inc. v. Neu,
500 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), where the noncompetition clause of a contract did not
contain a geographic limitation, the court ruled that after remand "the trial court must deter-
mine a reasonable geographic limitation." Id. at 563.
61. Miller, 300 So. 2d at 12 (citations omitted).
62. 389 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), review dismissed, 419 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 1982).
63. Id. at 1063. See also Xerographics, Inc. v. Thomas, 537 So. 2d 140, 143 (Fla. 2d DCA
1988) (The court reversed the trial court reduction in area of restriction on grounds that the
"noncompetition agreement was clear and unambiguous" and "reasonable on its face."). Simi-
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and, while sympathetic to the trial court's discomfort, directed entry
of an injunction. The court stated: "[W]e therefore find no basis in
the law for the ruling below which, while obviously well-motivated,
amounted simply to rewriting a duly-executed and valid contract so as
to relieve one of the parties of its burdens."6
As is demonstrated by that decision and others that followed Flam-
mer and Miller, Florida's judiciary had ushered in an era of minimal
deference to public policy and, instead, was focusing narrowly on the
time and geographic area aspects of the restrictive covenants. While
occasionally the trial judges objected to the seemingly harsh applica-
tion of these provisions,65 Florida appellate courts moved steadily to-
ward stricter enforcement of noncompetition agreements."
Relying on Miller, appellate courts routinely overturned trial court
denials of injunctive relief based upon the unreasonableness of the
covenant, with instructions to determine a reasonable length of time
and area and so modify the covenant. 67 Accordingly, trial court discre-
tion in modifying the time and area restrictions became the battle-
larly, in Florida Pest Control & Chem. Co. v. Thomas, 520 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), the
trial court refused to enforce a contract provision forbidding empbloyment in any manner with
any competitor of FPC because the provision was "too broad." The First District Court of
Appeal reversed, stating: "[When a contract is clear and unambiguous, the court cannot give it
the meaning other than that expressed in it, and cannot rewrite the contract for the parties." Id.
at 671.
64. Keller, 389 So. 2d at 1064.
65. The large number of appellate reversals of trial court denials of injunctive relief even
throughout the 1980s attest to the ongoing difficulty trial courts had in following this directive.
See, e.g., Sarasota Beverage Co. v. Johnson, 551 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Xerographics,
Inc. v. Thomas, 537 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); Joseph U. Moore, Inc. v. Neu, 500 So. 2d
561 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); Rollins Protective Serv. Co. v. Lammons, 472 So. 2d 812 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1985); Sentry Ins. v. Dunn, 411 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982).
66. This approach favoring modification to support enforcement found expression as early
as 1964 in American Building Maintenance Co. v. Fogelman, 167 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 3d DCA
1964), where the court upheld the trial court's reduction of the term of a noncompetition agree-
ment from three years to one year on grounds "that it was unreasonable to enjoin this man from
his livelihood for more than one year." Id. at 792. Similarly, in Kenco Chem. Mfg. Co. v.
Railey, 286 So. 2d 272 (Fla. Ist DCA 1973), the court upheld the trial court's reduction of the
time period in the noncompete agreement from five years to three and limitation of the geo-
graphical area to the state of Florida and certain areas of Georgia where there was no geographi-
cal area specified in the agreement. The court, upholding the trial court modifications, noted:
"Determination of reasonable limitations of the covenant as to time and geographical area was
within the province of the court." Id. at 274.
67. While the vast majority of appellate decisions concerning time and area restrictions
have involved appellate court reversals of trial court attempts to diminish or excuse violations,
there have been notable exceptions. See, e.g., U Shop Rite, Inc. v. Richard's Paint Mfg. Co.,
369 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979) (The court reversed the trial court's expansion of a 10-year
restriction into a perpetual injunction and its removal of a 350-mile geographic limit, in effect
making the geographical area of the covenant unlimited.).
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ground for appellate court scrutiny. In Availability, Inc. v. Riley,6 the
Second District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's finding that
the geographic limitations of the covenant were "unconscionable and
unenforceable," and said:
Accordingly, where noncompetitive agreements have been shown to
be reasonable, they have been consistently upheld by the Florida
courts. In determining the reasonableness of such an agreement the
courts first of all, as dictated by the statute, consider the expressed
limitations as to time and geographical area. Additionally, the courts
employ a balancing test to weigh the employer's interest in
preventing the competition against the oppressive effect on the
employee. 9
The court, ostensibly employing this balancing test, found no imbal-
ance, basing its decision, in part, on the trial court's finding that the
former employee was "otherwise well able to support himself and his
family."70
The implication of a balancing test is that substantially equal weight
will be accorded to the circumstances of the employee and to those of
the employer. As is evident from a portion of the opinion, the Riley
decision somewhat belies that implication: "The aforequoted statute
and the cases, as we read them, give discretion to the courts to con-
strue the reasonableness of a restrictive covenant on its own terms -
not discretion to rewrite it so as to be reasonable in other respects."'
The subtle but clear suggestion from this language is that there exists
an objective standard of reasonableness applicable to all such cove-
nants without regard to any particular subjective considerations,72 a
68. 336 So. 2d 668 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976) (trial court reduced area restriction from within a
100-mile radius of Tampa to Hillsborough County). Compare this case with Orkin Exterminat-
ing Co. v. Girardeau, 301 So. 2d 38 (Fla. Ist DCA 1974), where the court of appeal upheld the
trial court's reduction of the geographic area restriction from five counties to the San Jose por-
tion of the city of Jacksonville. Basing its decision on the premise that "[w]hat is a reasonable
area is a factual matter to be determined in each case," the court found that Girardeau's em-
ployment assignment had been exclusively to the San Jose area of Jacksonville. Id. at 40.
69. Riley, 336 So. 2d at 669-70 (footnotes omitted). See Sarasota Beverage Co. v. Johnson,
551 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (consideration of whether the threatened injury to the em-
ployer outweighed any possible harm to the employee was not relevant to the issue of whether to
grant injunctive relief but only to a determination of the reasonableness of the covenant as to
time and area).
70. Riley, 336 So. 2d at 670.
71. Id.
72. Contrast this approach with the two-step process advanced in American Bldg. Mainte-
nance Co. v. Fogelman, 167 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964). "In other words, there are two
determinations; (1) the reasonableness of the agreement per se; (2) the reasonableness of the
agreement as applied in the instant case, taking into consideration all of the facts, including
those which have occurred subsequent to the execution of the agreement." Id. at 792.
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theme consistent with Miller's rigid focus on time and place analysis.73
Absent unreasonable time and place restrictions, courts seemed sty-
mied in any opposition to enforcement of noncompetition agree-
ments. 74 The First District Court of Appeal, in Florida Pest Control &
Chemical Co. v. Thomas stated:
7
"
It has been repeatedly held that upon finding that the time and space
restrictions of a covenant not to compete are appropriate, and that
the employer has not itself breached the agreement, the trial court
has no power to do anything but enforce the terms of the covenant
as written by injunction.7 6
Other examples abound.77
Even in cases where the trial court has found that enforcement of a
specific noncompetition agreement would be unduly harsh and op-
pressive, enforcement has been upheld. 78 The rationale for this posi-
tion was set forth by the Third District Court of Appeal in Keller:9
Furthermore, it is established law that a court is not empowered to
refuse to give effect to such a contract on the basis of a finding, as
73. Miller Mechanical, Inc. v. Ruth, 300 So. 2d 11, 12 (Fla. 1974).
74. In fact, the Third District Court of Appeal endorsed an extension to this proposition in
Royal Serv. v. Williams, 334 So. 2d 154, 156 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). The court held that in the
absence of a finding by the trial court that the time and area were unreasonable, the trial court
was not at liberty to elect not to enforce the noncompete contract. Id. at 157. The court reversed
the denial of injunctive relief even though the trial court found that the restrictive covenants
were not reasonable, "went beyond the scope of protecting any interest of the employer," and
would be unduly harsh and oppressive. Id. at 156. The trial court further held that the "agree-
ment amounts to an undue and an unreasonable restraint of trade and would be detrimental to
the public welfare and obnoxious to public policy." Id. It should be noted that Williams was an
unskilled employee, providing janitorial and cleaning services. Id.
75. 520 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (court reversed trial court's refusal to enforce pro-
vision forbidding employment in any manner by a competitor of the former employer).
76. Id. at 671.
77. See Air Ambulance Network, Inc. v. Floribus, 511 So. 2d 702, 703 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
(The court reversed denial of injunctive relief, stating: "[U]pon findings, such as those reached
below, that the time and space restrictions are appropriate .... the trial court has no power to
do anything but enforce the terms of the covenant as written by injunction."). See also Xero-
graphics, Inc. v. Thomas, 537 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (court reversed trial court's reduc-
tion of geographic area covered by restriction from five counties to three counties on grounds
that it would be "unreasonable and oppressive"); Kverne v. Rollins Protective Serv. Co., 515
So. 2d 1320 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (appellate court directed trial court to extend injunction for the
full two-year period set forth in the agreement).
78. Rollins Protective Serv. Co. v. Lammons, 472 So. 2d 812, 813 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)
(reversed trial court's denial of injunctive relief on grounds "that the enforcement of the provi-
sion would not accomplish its intended purpose and would be unduly harsh and oppressive on
the employees.").
79. 389 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), review dismissed, 419 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 1982) (The
court specifically rejected the trial court's "balancing the equities" approach to enforcement,
which resulted in modification of the terms of the noncompetition agreement.).
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was the case below, that enforcement of its terms would produce an
'unjust result' in the form of an overly burdensome effect upon the
employee.1°
Thus, as with unreasonable time and geographic area restrictions, a
finding by the trial court that enforcement of the provision would be
unduly harsh and oppressive was not a basis to invalidate an agree-
ment. Rather, the power of trial courts is limited to modifying agree-
ments to ameliorate the harsh results. Because, in substance, this is
done by modifying the time and place restrictions, the so-called harsh-
ness or oppression issues devolve into the same analysis. As stated by
the Third District Court of Appeal in Orkin Exterminating Co. v.
Martin:81
If a covenant not to compete is facially reasonable, the burden shifts
to the employee to show why the covenant is unreasonable as applied
to him .... Where the territorial restriction is unreasonable, the
trial court may determine what constitutes a reasonable area and
enforce the covenant in the limited area.82
This concept of "facially reasonable" further erodes any balance in
the enforcement equation. It implies an objective standard for evalua-
tion of the time and area provisions of the covenant rather than an
analysis that considers the individual concerns and hardships of the
employee. The burden on the former employee is further compounded
by the obligation in contesting the noncompetition agreement to plead
and prove unreasonableness as a defense to an injunctive claim83 un-
less the noncompetition agreement is "facially violative" of the rea-
sonably limited time and area requirements of section 542.33 .4 An
inherently imprecise standard, the "facially reasonable" or "facially
80. Id. at 1063.
81. 516 So. 2d 970 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (The court rejected the trial court's reduction of the
geographic area stipulated in the covenant from all of Dade County to the territory where the
employee had worked.).
82. Id. at 971-72. Compare Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Girardeau, 301 So. 2d 38 (Fla. Ist
DCA 1974), cert. denied, 317 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 1975) (geographical area covered by noncompeti-
tion agreement reduced from five counties to specific area within the City of Jacksonville);
Graphic Business Sys. v. Rogge, 418 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (agreement not to compete
for two years after termination of employment within 75-mile radius of the city of Tampa was
facially reasonable).
83. Tomasello, Inc. v. Los Santos, 394 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) (rejecting trial
court's unilateral reduction of a countywide geographical area restriction to the area of former
employee's prior employment where the former employee had not raised the issue of reasonable-
ness).
84. Id. at 1072.
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violative" criteria is not made easier for the former employee by the
fact that the agreements are invariably drafted by lawyers for employ-
ers.
Essentially reducing most analysis to objective criteria governing the
time component of noncompetition agreements, Florida courts under-
standably hold that the facts and circumstances of each case are criti-
cal to a determination of what is reasonable.8 5 In Dorminy v. Frank B.
Hall & Co., the Fifth District Court of Appeal found no basis in the
record to show either that the three-year time limit was unreasonable
or that it would work any exceptional hardship on Dorminy to justify
the time reduction. 86 Because the agreement was neither facially unrea-
sonable nor proven by the employee to be oppressive as applied, it
was enforced in accordance with its terms.
According to Dorminy, a one- to two-year time limit has been
widely accepted. The court stated: "[T]here is no set time limit for
enforcement of covenants not to compete, although one to two years
are the time limits which have been upheld in Florida against former
employees competing with former employers." 8 7 Also, the court in
Dorminy found that the position held by the former employee is a
relevant consideration, stating: "[T]he higher in management and the
more key or important the function performed by the employee the
longer the time which could be justified for a no-competition cove-
nant. In such a case, a longer time may be needed to protect the for-
mer employer's business." ' 88
A related but less frequently discussed issue is the nature of the
competition restricted by the noncompete clause. In at least one case,
an appellate court has rewritten the noncompete agreement to restrict
a narrower range of competitive activity, while upholding the imposi-
tion of an injunction.89 In Marshall v. Gore, the Second District Court
of Appeal invalidated a noncompete agreement to the extent that it
prohibited the former employee from engaging in the development
85. Dorminy v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 464 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985) (court reversed
the trial court's reduction of noncompete time period from three years to one and one-half
years). It is worthwhile noting that Florida courts have upheld the enforceability of covenants
not to compete extraterritorially. See Carnahan v. Alexander Proudfoot Co. World Headquar-
ters, 581 So. 2d 184, 186 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (court instructed trial court to modify its order so
as to encompass only the country of Australia).
86. 464 So. 2d at 158. Compare Suave Shoe Corp. v. Fernandez, 390 So. 2d 799, 801 (Fla.
3d DCA 1980) (The court noted that "the failure of the plaintiff to seek an injunction for more
than a year after the defendant terminated his employment is not a basis for the denial of the
injunction, rather it is the basis for the trial court's fashioning of the reasonableness of the
period of time an injunction will be in force.").
87. 464 So. 2d at 158.
88. Id. The court also noted that Dorminy received extremely valuable stock in considera-
tion for entering into the contract containing the covenant not to compete.
89. Marshall v. Gore, 506 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987).
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and marketing of computer software and, accordingly, reduced the
scope of the trial court's order to restrict competition only "in the
development and marketing of computer software for management
and programming of dairy feeding programs."90 In Marshall, the geo-
graphic restriction was nationwide, and the court's decision to limit
rather than prohibit Marshall's employment in the field of computer
software may have reflected concerns that he would be otherwise un-
employable.
C. Applicability of Section 542.33 to Parties Other Than Original
Parties to Noncompetition Agreements
The terms of section 542.33 are expressly made applicable to "one
who is employed as an agent, independent contractor, or employee"
and to the "employer." Notwithstanding this language, there have
been various attempts to broaden the categories of parties who can
enforce noncompetition agreements and who must abide by them.
With respect to the enforcement of noncompetition agreements, the
Second District Court of Appeal in Manpower, Inc. v. Olsten Perma-
nent Agency,91 ruled that section 542.33 "cannot be extended to per-
mit a third party beneficiary to enforce a covenant not to compete." 92
The unmistakable conclusion from this case is that there must be some
form of an explicitly defined contractual nexus binding the enforcing
party and the party agreeing not to compete for such an agreement to
be enforceable. A review of the current case law fails to disclose any
dissenting or contrary opinion on this issue. Subsequently, in Gory
Associated Industries v. Griffin,93 the Fourth District Court of Appeal
ruled that a covenant not to compete contained in an employment
contract was enforceable by an affiliate of the original contracting
employer. 94 This result was premised upon the plain language of the
90. Id. at 92.
91. 309 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). The court specifically rejected the claim of two
franchises, not parties to the original employment agreement, for injunctive relief as third-party
beneficiaries of the underlying contract. Id. at 58-59.
92. Id. at 59. Compare Auto Club Affiliates, Inc. v. Donahey, 281 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1973). Donahey had originally executed an employment contract with K & K Insurance
Agency, Inc., all of the stock of which was owned by Nord W. Krauskopf and his wife. Subse-
quently, Krauskopf assigned this contract to Auto Club Affiliates, Inc., another company he
owned. The court briefly noted that "Donahey accepted the change in titular employer." Id. at
241. There was no further discussion of this issue.
93. 397 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).
94. Id. at 1055.
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agreement. By its terms, the contract clearly stated that it applied not
only to the original contracting employer but also to its affiliates.95
In addition to affiliates of the employer, assignees can enforce cove-
nants not to compete. 91 In Pino v. Spanish Broadcasting Systems,
Inc., Pino originally signed a five-year employment contract with Ra-
dio WCMQ, Inc. and Great Joy, Inc., which contained a twelve-
month covenant not to compete.9 7 This contract provided that it was
"transferable or assignable.''98 Subsequently, the assets of these two
entities were sold to Spanish Broadcasting System. As part of the sale,
Pino's employment contract was assigned to Spanish Broadcasting
System. 99 Approximately three years later, while the employment con-
tract was still operative, "Pino contracted with Viva America Media
Group for the position of program director and 'on the air personal-
ity' at Viva's FM radio station.' °  Spanish Broadcasting System
brought an action seeking a temporary injunction to enforce the non-
competition agreement. The trial court granted the injunction.' 0' On
appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal rejected Pino's claim that
section 542.33 prohibited the enforcement of a covenant not to com-
pete by an employer who was not a party to the original agreement
and upheld the trial court's order granting injunctive relief. 02
The other side of the question of who may enforce noncompetition
agreements is the issue of whom they may be enforced against. In a
leading decision on this issue, Temporarily Yours-Temporary Help
Services v. Manpower, Inc.,03 the First District Court of Appeal ruled
that a noncompetition agreement was binding not only on the former
employee but also on the rival corporation the employee estab-
lished.' 4 Finding that the newly formed corporation's primary pur-
95. Id. at 1056 Griffin initially signed an employment contract with Elcor Corporation that
contained a one-year covenant not to compete applicable to both Elcor Corporation and its
affiliates. Immediately thereafter, Griffin was transferred to Gory Associated Industries, Inc.,
an affiliate of Elcor.
96. 564 So. 2d 186 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).
97. Id. at 187.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 186. It was also alleged by Spanish Broadcasting System that Pino had orally
assented to the assignment of her employment contract following the sale. However, the court
relied on the fact that Pino had specifically agreed in writing that her employment contract,
including the noncompetition provision, was assignable. Id. at 189.
100. Id. at 187.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 189.
103. 377 So. 2d 825 (Fla. Ist DCA 1979).
104. Id. Jones, the former employee, was instrumental in establishing Temporarily Yours
and became its president and only operating officer. He was not a stockholder but had an oral
understanding with the sole stockholder that he could purchase stock in the corporation at a
later date.
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pose was to assist the former employee in violating his covenant not to
compete, the court held that such agreements are enforceable against
the parties and "also those identified with them in interest, in privity
with them, represented by them or subject to their control."' 0 5
This same rationale was followed by the Second District Court of
Appeal in Tampa Bay Business Publishing Co. v. Zink'0° to support
the entry of an injunction against Zink, the former employee, and
Zincom, Inc., the corporation he formed, prohibiting competition
with Tampa Bay Business Publishing. 017 Similarly, in Dad's Proper-
ties, Inc. v. Lucas,1°8 the Second District Court of Appeal, relying on
Temporarily Yours, reversed the denial of entry of an injunction
against the wife of the contracting party and the corporation formed
by her.'09 In so doing, the court stated: "[L]ooking beyond the corpo-
rate fictions utilized by Mr. and Mrs. Lucas, it is clear that they inten-
tionally violated the covenant by setting up a competing business." '" 0
105. Id. at 827. Compare U Shop Rite, Inc. v. Richard's Paint Mfg. Co., 369 So. 2d 1033
(Fla. 4th DCA 1979). The trial court issued an injunction against not only O.A. Griffis and U
Shop Rite, Inc., parties to noncompete agreements, but also to Paint Right Manufacturing, Inc.,
Ronald V. Rowsey, and their agents, servants, and/or employees, and those acting in concert
with them. The appellate court reversed, noting, without comment or case law citation: "The
injunction is also excessive where it enjoins persons other than those party to the contract." Id.
at 1034. See also Channel v. Applied Research, Inc., 472 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). The
court upheld the imposition of a fine on the subsequent employer, along with the former em-
ployees, for violation of an injunction issued to enforce a noncompetition covenant. Relying on
Temporarily Yours and the subsequent employer's apparent knowledge of the injunction, the
court found the subsequent employer as one in privity with the parties defendant, the former
employees. Id. at 1263.
106. 439 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 447 So. 2d 889 (1983).
107. Id. at 274. It should be noted that the court did reverse the trial court's failure to issue
an injunction against the newly formed corporation even following its sale to this third party. Id.
at 275. The court instructed the trial court "to determine a reasonable period of time for opera-
tion of the injunction." Id. However, the court refused to find that the injunction issued against
the former employee was binding on the subsequent purchaser of the corporation, formed by the
employee, because the purchaser "was not acting in concert with Zink to evade the trial court's
injunction through the purchase of Zincom." Id. at 274. While the purchaser had knowledge of
the injunctive proceedings, the injunction was not perfected before the purchase. Id.
108. 545 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989).
109. Id. at 929. Albert C. Lucas and Al Lucas Enterprises, Inc., sold their adult nightclub to
Dad's Properties, Inc. Id. at 927. The covenant not to compete entered into as part of this sale
was for a period of five years, within a 50-mile radius, "either directly or indirectly, as an indi-
vidual, partner, employee, stockholder, or consultant." Id. About one year later, Susan Lucas,
Albert Lucas' wife, formed Martus, Inc., which began operating a similar nightclub within the
50-mile radius. Id. Mrs. Lucas was the sole shareholder, director, and officer of Martus. Mr.
Lucas worked for Martus as manager of the nightclub. Id.
110. Id. at 928. See also Kusner v. American Minerals, Inc., 460 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 3d DCA
1984) (The Third District ruled that the term "salesman" in the contract provision relating to the
noncompetition covenant was not applicable to the corporation's former president.).
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D. Availability of Noncompete Injunctive Relief
Once a noncompetition agreement has satisfied the threshold re-
quirements of section 542.33, the statute empowers the trial court to
determine, in the exercise of its judicial discretion, whether such an
agreement should be enforced by injunctive relief. Notwithstanding
the permissive language of section 542.33(2)(a) that "[s]aid agree-
ments may, in the discretion of a court of competent jurisdiction, be
enforced by injunction,""' in practice, this discretion has been nar-
rowly confined. From the earliest days of the statute, appellate courts
have admonished trial courts that the ostensibly permissive language
"does not imply that the court is vested with an absolute or arbitrary
discretion, and is construed as requiring that the discretion shall be
reasonably exercised to the end that the object of the statute may not
be nullified."1 2
In 1974, the Florida Supreme Court firmly established the prefer-
ence for injunctive relief in Miller Mechanical, Inc. v. Ruth."3 In
Miller, the court overturned the trial court's denial of an injunction
and an award of only nominal damages stating: "[W]here the trial
court finds that there is a valid contract it would be error for the court
not to grant an appropriate remedy."" 4 The court went on to add that
"[t]he Court may award damages for breach of contract but the nor-
mal remedy is to grant an injunction."" 5 This unambiguous declara-
tion may, as much as any other factor, explain the prevalence of
Florida appellate decisions reversing lower court denials of injunctive
relief." 6
Conversely, trial court decisions enforcing noncompetition agree-
ments through injunctive relief have rarely been disturbed.17 Under-
scoring this judicial affinity for enforcement has been the erosion of
standard equitable principles in actions involving noncompetition
agreements. The most glaring example of this erosion has been the
111. FLA. STAT. § 542.33(2)(a) (1991) (emphasis added).
112. Atlas Travel Serv. v. Morelly, 98 So. 2d 816, 818 (Fla. Ist DCA 1957).
113. 300 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 1974).
114. Id. at 12.
115. Id.
116. See Florida Pest Control & Chem. Co. v. Thomas, 520 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988);
Rollins Protective Serv. Co. v. Lammons, 472 So. 2d 812 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); Twenty Four
Collection, Inc. v. Keller, 389 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), review dismissed, 419 So. 2d
1048 (Fla. 1982); Empiregas, Inc. v. Thomas, 359 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Foster and Co.
v. Snodgrass, 333 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976).
117. See Maimone v. Wackenhut Corp., 329 So. 2d 332, 333 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) (The court
upheld the trial court's entry of injunctive relief in favor of a former employer based on a find-
ing that the former employee "voluntarily signed this employment contract which contained the
noncompetition provision.") This case evidences the level of predisposition toward enforcement.
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failure to require a showing of irreparable injury in noncompetition
cases even though this element has long been an essential component
of other actions for injunctive relief in Florida.118
In one discussion of injunctive relief, the Fourth District omitted
any mention of irreparable harm,119 although it did mention its first
cousin, lack of an adequate legal remedy. 20
In summarizing the allegations that are sufficient to state a cause of
action under that statute, the court listed the following: "(a) The con-
tract (b) The appellant's intentional direct and material breach
thereof. (c) No adequate remedy except by injunctive relief."121
Going a critical step further, the Third District Court of Appeal in
Puga v. Suave Shoe Corp.'2 jettisoned any need to make a particular
showing of irreparable harm or inadequate legal remedy. The court
stated:
ITihe showing in the record that the covenant in question was being
directly violated and that 'from the nature of the act or the
circumstances [the breach] cannot be readily, adequately, and
completely compensated for with money,' ... is itself sufficient to
support the finding of irreparable injury which was made by the trial
judge and which is necessary to justify such an order.In
This dispensation with the longstanding injunctive prerequisites
found growing support among other Florida courts addressing this
issue. 124
Not all decisions were in complete accord.1 25 For example in
118. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.610(a)(1); 29 FLA. Jutr. 2D Injunctions §§ 21-22 (1981) ("Jurisdic-
tion to grant injunctive relief should be exercised only when intervention is essential to protect
property, or other rights of which chancery will take cognizance, against irreparable injury. The
complainant must allege and establish facts from which. irreparable injury can reasonably be
inferred."); Wilson v. Sandstrom, 317 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 1975); Russell v. Florida Ranch Lands,
Inc., 414 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982).
119. Hunter v. North Am. Biologicals, Inc., 287 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974).
120. Id. at 728.
121. Id.
122. 374 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
123. Id. (citations omitted).
124. See, e.g., Foster & Co. v. Snodgrass, 333 So. 2d 521, 522 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976) (The
court reversed the refusal to grant injunctive relief, noting that "where the agreement is neither
harsh nor oppressive, then under Fla. Stat. § 542.12(2) the employee's violation thereof is a
sufficient basis for enforcement."). See also Chessick Clinic v. Jones, 367 So. 2d 1028 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1979).
125. See, e.g., Damsey v. Mankowitz, 339 So. 2d 282, 283 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) (upholding
the denial of injunctive relief against a former employee doctor stating that "[tihe granting or
denying of injunctive relief rests largely in the discretion of the chancellor and is governed by the
facts and circumstances of the particular case."). See also Uni-Chem Corp. v. Maret, 338 So. 2d
885, 887 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) (affirming the denial of an injunction recognizing "the necessity of
showing irreparable harm as a prerequisite to the granting of a temporary injunction" and "the
discretionary right of a chancellor to decline to enter a temporary injunction.").
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Forrest v. Kornblatt, 26 the Third District Court of Appeal upheld
the trial court's denial of injunctive relief, noting that under sec-
tion 542.33, "the trial judge is called upon to exercise sound judi-
cial discretion in determining whether such a covenant is
conscionable and is reasonably limited in time and area.' ' 27 This
concept of sound judicial discretion as applied to actions arising under
section 542.33 found little support outside the Third District. Accord-
ingly, decisions requiring a showing of irreparable harm before the
issuance of injunctive relief by the trial court in the exercise of its
judicial discretion became a rarity.2
Thus, although a general movement away from irreparable injury in
noncompetition cases was underway during the late 1970s and early
1980s, some courts continued to grapple with the issue.' 29 Neverthe-
less, increasingly throughout the early 1980s, courts downgraded the
requirement of irreparale harm to the point of applying a quasi-judi-
cial notice approach that essentially presumed irreparable harm. 130
Perhaps one of the clearest explanations of this rationale is found in
Satellite Industries v. Stutz. 3' In reversing the trial court's denial of
injunctive relief, the Fourth District Court of Appeal said: "Satellite
has alleged the existence of a contract, the intentional, direct, and ma-
terial breach of that agreement, and the lack of an adequate remedy
except by injunctive relief. These skeletal allegations, supported by ev-
idence at the hearing below, are sufficient to obtain a preliminary in-
junction."' 3 2 Thus, during the 1980s, appellate courts enforced
126. 328 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). There was no discussion of the facts and circum-
stances surrounding the covenant not to compete and the alleged breach. These were subsumed
under the court's general observation that "[tihis record does not show an abuse of discretion
under the circumstances of this case." Id. at 529.
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., Uni-Chem Corp. v. Maret, 338 So. 2d 885, 887 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) (In up-
holding the trial court's refusal to grant a temporary injunction, the district court noted that
"[n]otwithstanding statutory right to injunctive relief [see: § 542.12 Fla. Stat.], upon proof of a
valid covenant not to compete said statutory provision does not negate the necessity of showing
irreparable harm as a prerequisite to the granting of a temporary injunction.").
129. See Contemporary Interiors, Inc. v. Four Marks, Inc., 384 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 4th DCA
1980) (party seeking an injunction must prove irreparable harm).
130. See Summerlin v. LaMar Advertising, 419 So. 2d 781, 782 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (allega-
tion in the complaint that "the damages that Plaintiff will sustain cannot be determined and
compensated for in an action at law. . ." was sufficient to satisfy the requirement of irreparable
harm); Graphic Business Sys., Inc. v. Rogge, 418 So. 2d 1084, 1086 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (not
practical to require proof of irreparable harm because this "would tend to diminish the efficacy
of covenants not to compete").
131. 437 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).
132. Id. at 223. In addition, while noting the trial court's broad discretion in granting or
denying preliminary injunctions, the court ruled that this "discretion is not unlimited particu-
larly in the face of a binding written contract between the parties." Id.
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noncompetition agreements, reversing numerous trial judges who
failed to grant injunctive relief. 33
Another decision confirming the erosion of any irreparable harm
requirement was Silvers v. Dis-Com Securities, Inc. 34 In a decision
that contrasted the elements generally necessary in an injunctive claim
with the more limited requirements in actions arising under section
542.33,' 31 the Fourth District Court of Appeal capsulized prevailing
analysis of irreparable harm, stating: "Implicit in our holding is a rec-
ognition that irreparable injury may be presumed in cases involving
violation of a covenant not to compete or not to divulge trade secrets.
It need not be alleged nor proved.113 6 Alternatively, courts found suf-
ficient evidence of irreparable harm in either the inability to establish
money damages or the lack of an adequate remedy at law. 13 7
Any lingering doubt regarding the issue of "irreparable injury" was
conclusively resolved by the Florida Supreme Court in 1985. In Ca-
praro v. Lanier Business Products, Inc.y18 the court held that when a
valid covenant not to compete is breached, irreparable injury should
be presumed and does not have to be proved as a prerequisite to in-
junctive relief. 39 This decision marked the culmination of years of
ever-narrowing judicial review of noncompetition agreements and the
zenith in terms of the pro-enforcement attitude toward such agree-
ments. This approach to irreparable harm became more firmly estab-
lished and entrenched following the Capraro decision so that
covenants not to compete were almost automatically enforced, and on
appeal denial was routinely reversed.Y4 In fact, the presumption of
133. See U.S. Floral Corp. v. Salazar, 475 So. 2d 1305 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Sentry Ins. v.
Dunn, 411 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Twenty Four Collection, Inc. v. Keller, 389 So. 2d
1062 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), review denied, 419 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 1982).
134. 403 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).
135. Id. at 1136. The court specifically noted the rule set out in Hunter v. North Am. Biol-
ogicals, Inc., 287 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974).
136. 403 So. 2d at 1136 (emphasis added). See also Sentry Ins. v. Dunn, 411 So. 2d 336 (Fla.
5th DCA 1982).
137. Tiffany Sands, Inc. v. Mezhibovsky, 463 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). See also Cash
v. Surf Club, 436 So. 2d 970 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).
138. 466 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1985). This decision was over the vigorous dissent of Justice Ben
Overton, who called upon the Florida Legislature to amend or modify § 542.33 to require proof
of irreparable harm. Id. at 21:4.
139. Id. at 213.
140. See Cordis Corp. v. Prooslin, 482 So. 2d 486, 490 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (After reviewing
the general requirements for a temporary injunction, the court stated: "In the context of cove-
nants not to compete or not to divulge trade secrets, this general rule has been relaxed so that
irreparable injury may be presumed."). See also Xerographics, Inc. v. Thomas, 537 So. 2d 140,
143 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) ("For purposes of a temporary injunction, irreparable injury is pre-
sumed where there is a violation of a noncompetition agreement."); T.K. Communications v.
Herman, 505 So. 2d 484, 486 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (Relying on Capraro, the court ruled
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irreparable injury upon the breach of a valid covenant not to compete
was subsequently held to be conclusive as a matter of law. 41 Accord-
ingly, in order to establish entitlement to injunctive relief in a cove-
nant not to compete case, a party need only prove the existence of a
valid agreement, the intentional and material breach, and no adequate
remedy other than injunctive relief. 42
E. Defenses to Enforcement
1. General Discussion
Notwithstanding the maxim that statutes in derogation of common
law are to be strictly construed, the historical development of the case
law under section 542.33 has provided scant nourishment for de-
fenses. Few defenses can completely bar enforcement of noncompeti-
tion agreements, and even those have not always been hospitably
received by the courts.
The most promising line of defense lies in the dynamic of exclusion.
That is, either the covenant falls to encompass the complained-of ac-
tivity or it does not fall within the criteria specifically authorized by
section 542.33. This has included establishing that the alleged compet-
itive activities did not fall within the parameters of the noncompeti-
tion agreement.143 Similarly, a former employee was successful in
asserting that a restrictive covenant expired with the termination of an
"[w]here a covenant not to compete is violated, irreparable injury is presumed and does not have
to be proven to obtain an injunction.").
141. Air Ambulance Network, Inc. v. Floribus, 511 So. 2d 702, 703 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987),
rev. denied, 520 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 1988) (This conclusive presumption of irreparable injury
"clearly precludes inquiry into the existence of 'irreparable injury,' which is now deemed estab-
lished as a matter of law in a case like this."). For a discussion of whether the presumption
should be conclusive or rebuttable, see Sarasota Beverage Co. v. Johnson, 551 So. 2d 503 (Fla.
2d DCA 1989).
142. Pinch-A-Penny, Inc. v. Chango, 557 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). See also Sarasota
Beverage Co., 551 So. 2d at 509 ("Consequently, the trial judge's discretion is rightfully limited
in this type of case to a determination of whether there is a valid (i.e., reasonable as to time and
area) noncompetition agreement, whether the former employee breached the agreement, and
whether no adequate remedy at law exists."). It may, in fact, be that this judicial softening of
the traditional high standards necessary to impose the extraordinary and drastic remedy of in-
junctive relief spawned the legislative initiative to amend section 542.33 in the 1990 session of the
Florida Legislature. This matter is discussed in more detail in the text accompanying notes 173-
212, infra.
143. Frumkes v. Beasley-Reed Broadcasting, Inc., 533 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). Un-
der the terms of the employment agreement, the covenant not to compete was only operative if
the employment agreement was terminated by Reed for cause. Frumkes voluntarily tendered a
letter of resignation.
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employment contract. 144 Also, arguments that a restrictive covenant is
not encompassed within section 542.33 have been successful. 145 Some
agreements have also been successfully challenged on grounds that the
activities of the former employee do not constitute competition.' 46
Another defense raised by former employees is lack of considera-
tion for the covenant not to compete, an argument that is rarely suc-
cessful. 47 Routinely rejecting this defense, some courts have exercised
creativity to find consideration present in the employment relation-
ship. 48 Another long shot is laches, or the failure of the former em-
ployer to promptly seek an injunction. In one case in which the
employer waited for more than a year after the former employee was
terminated, the court rejected laches as the basis for the denial of in-
junctive relief, finding the delay as merely a factor to be considered in
determining the reasonableness of the injunctive period.149
2. Harshness, Oppression, or Offense to Public Policy
For the most part, "unreasonableness" has not been deemed an ad-
equate justification for invalidating an entire noncompetition agree-
ment. As already noted, unreasonableness has generally been viewed
purely in the context of the time and area of the restriction, both of
which can be modified and thereby cured within the discretion of the
court. Dicta in a few cases, each of which upheld the validity of the
144. See, e.g., Flatley v. Forbes, 483 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) ("[T]he exception [un-
der section 542.33] does not encompass an agreement in which the buyer of a business agrees not
to compete with the seller of the same business."); Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. Streetman and
Assoc., Inc., 390 So. 2d 134, 136 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) ("[S]ection 542.12 has no application to
in-term restraints, restraints existing for the duration of the term of employment.").
145. Zimmer v. Pony Exp. Courier Corp., 408 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).
146. Compare Dunkin, D.O. v. Barkus & Kronstadt, D.O.'s, 533 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 3d DCA
1988) with Answer All Tel. Secretarial Serv., Inc. v. Call 24 Inc., 381 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 5th DCA
1980).
147. See Tasty Box Lunch Co. v. Kennedy, 121 So. 2d 52, 54 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960) ("Inas-
much as the employment was a continuing contract terminable at the will of the employer or the
employee, the continued employment and agreement to pay commissions was consideration for
the employee's agreement not to compete.").
148. See, e.g., Criss v. Davis, Presser & La Faye, P.A., 494 So. 2d 525, 527 (Fla. 1st DCA
1986) ("The contract between DP & L and Criss was also terminable at will. Criss also received a
continuation of his employment for two years, in addition to a salary increase. Accordingly, we
hold that there was adequate consideration for the employment contract."); Wright & Seaton,
Inc. v. Prescott, 420 So. 2d 623, 626 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) ("[T~he obligation on appellant's part
to give written notice of termination can be held to be the consideration eliminating the need for
mutual obligation.").
149. Suave Shoe Corp. v. Fernandez, 390 So. 2d 799, 801 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) (Delay in
seeking an injunction "is not a basis for the denial of the injunction, rather it is the basis for the
trial court's fashioning of the reasonableness of the period of time an injunction will be in
force.").
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noncompetition agreement, have given some recognition to this de-
fense. In one case, the Florida Supreme Court hinted at the character-
istics that might sustain this defense when it pointed out the lack of
"any overriding public interest in having the restricted employee's
services available to it."'' 0 In spite of this overture, defenses based on
oppressive results, like unreasonableness, have achieved only nominal
success.' 5' For the most part, the applicable appellate decisions have
merely given lip service to the harshness, oppressiveness, or unreason-
ableness of the restrictive covenant, while, at the same time, enforcing
the provisions of the noncompetition agreement.5 2 During the proen-
forcement era of the 1980s, this approach was crystallized in the fol-
lowing holding by the Second District Court of Appeal in Pinch-A-
Penny, Inc. v. Chango:'53 "The court may not refuse to give effect to
a valid noncompete agreement on the ground that it would have an
overly burdensome effect on the employee."'15 4 A rare deviation from
this philosophy occurred in a case in which the monetary sanction im-
posed as a penalty for competing was deemed so oppressive as to ren-
der the covenant wholly unenforceable.'
Similarly, attempts to modify the terms of the noncompetition
agreement on grounds that enforcement of the covenant would be un-
duly harsh or oppressive have met with minimal success.' In Orkin
Exterminating Co. v. Girardeau,57 in an isolated dispensation of
mercy, the court reduced the noncompete area to a portion of the city
150. Capelouto v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 183 So. 2d 532, 534 (Fla. 1966); see also Atlas
Travel Serv. v. Morelly, 98 So. 2d 816 (Fla. Ist DCA 1957).
151. It should be noted, however, that the recent amendment to § 542.33 demands consider-
ation of "unreasonableness" as a threshold question to enforcement of the noncompetition
agreement. This is discussed in more detail in the text accompanying notes 173-212, infra.
152. See, e.g., Twenty Four Collection, Inc. v. Keller, 389 So. 2d 1062, 1063 (Fla. 3d DCA
1980) ("[I]t is established law that a court is not empowered to refuse to give effect to such a
contract on the basis of a finding, as was the case below, that enforcement of its terms would
produce an 'unjust result' in the form of an overly burdensome effect upon the employee.");
Barco Chem. Div., Inc. v. Colton, 296 So. 2d 649, 650 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974) ("The trial judge
may not refuse to enforce a valid contract upon a general finding that enforcement will produce
unjust results.").
153. 557 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); see also Rollins Protective Serv. Co. v. Lammons,
472 So. 2d 812 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985).
154. Id. at 940.
155. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland v. La Salle, 413 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). This case
does stand for the proposition that the facts of a particular enforcement action concerning a
covenant not to compete can be so egregious as to constitute the covenant as an unreasonable
restraint of trade.
156. See Florida Pest Control & Chem. Co. v. Thomas, 520 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
(Even if enforcement of the provision would be unduly harsh and oppressive, this was not an
adequate reason to justify refusal.); Xerographics, Inc. v. Thomas, 537 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 2d DCA
1988).
157. 301 So. 2d 38 (Fla. Ist DCA 1974), cert. denied, 317 So. 2d 75 (1975).
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of Jacksonville. 5 One factor perhaps motivating the result was Or-
kin's presenting an employment contract to Girardeau four months
after he was employed with the ultimatum that he either sign or be
"out on the streets."' 59
Where a community's need for health care is implicated, slightly
greater hope may lie in defenses predicated upon public policy. And
even in that relatively confined area, the results have not been uni-
form. In one case, the First District Court of Appeal, upholding a
two-year noncompetition agreement, acknowledged the need for pe-
diatricians in the area but concluded that enforcement would not
jeopardize the public health. 160 Conversely, in Damsey v. Mankow-
itz,' 61 the Third District Court of Appeal reached a contrary result
through a seemingly compatible analysis when it refused to enforce a
three-year noncompetition agreement signed by a surgeon practicing
in the Florida Keys. 62 The court observed that enforcement of the ge-
ographic restriction would require the surgeon to move seventy miles
to escape the restraining covenant.1 63 In that event, the court found
that an important public interest would be undermined: "The testi-
mony also revealed a compelling need for defendant's services as a
surgeon in the area and enforcement of the covenant would jeopardize
the public health of the community."'1' Since this decision was ren-
dered, no subsequent cases have adopted jeopardy to the public wel-
fare as the basis for invalidating a noncompetition agreement.
3. Breach of Contract or Discharge by the Employer
As was recognized in the leading decision of Troup v. Heacock,'65
an employer who breaches the contract of employment or similar
agreement with an employee may be precluded from enforcing a non-
competition agreement against the employee. The breach, however,
must be material. 66 Thus, the employer's mere failure to provide the
employee with knowledge and training does not rise to this level. 67
158. Id. at 40.
159. Id. at 39.
160. Hefelfinger v. David, 305 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975).
161. 339 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), cert. denied, 345 So. 2d 421 (1977). The fact that
the employer terminated the employment relationship by failing to renew the employment con-
tract was noted, without comment, and may have influenced the court's decision.
162. Id. at 283.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. 367 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (employer unilaterally reduced employee's salary by
over 50% and ultimately fired him for unknown reasons).
166. Id. at 692.
167. Suave Shoe Corp. v. Fernandez, 390 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
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Additionally, the employer's breach has been recognized as the basis
for denial of a preliminary injunction, pending a full trial on the mer-
its. 16e The rationale for this conclusion is based upon the equitable
maxim of "unclean hands." If the conduct of the employer is nothing
short of unconscionable, the courts will not intervene on behalf of the
employer to perpetuate the unconscionable conduct by issuing an in-
junction order.
When an employer discharges an employee, several different scenar-
ios exist for the enforceability of noncompetition agreements. Troup
stands for the proposition that if termination is wrongful, Florida
courts will not allow the former employer to restrain the wrongfully
discharged employee from competition. Florida law is less clear in
cases where no evidence of wrongful discharge or unconscionability
on the part of the employer is present. Unfortunately, the relevant
reported decisions generally do not indicate whether the former em-
ployee was discharged or not and whether such discharge was with or
without cause. Those few cases that mention this fact, for the most
part, fall to regard it as a significant element in their analysis of the
employer's entitlement to injunctive relief.6 9 While it is difficult to
trace a clear pattern in all such cases, 170 the better view is that, in the
absence of employer wrongdoing, the noncompetition agreement is
enforceable even in the hands of the employer who fired the former
employee.' 7' The only possible variation on this observation is in cases
where there may have been a written or oral modification of the terms
of the noncompetition agreement.7 2
168. Cordis Corp. v. Prooslin, 482 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). Compare Tiffany Sands,
Inc. v. Mezhibovsky, 463 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (employee claim of material breach of
employment agreement by employer must await full hearing on the merits); Channell v. Applied
Research, Inc., 472 So. 2d 1260, 1262 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985) ("Our study of the record and briefs
convinces us that the trial court could find there was inadequate evidence of alleged breaches by
Applied which would nullify Applied's right to a temporary injunction.").
169. See Kverne v. Rollins Protective Serv. Co., 515 So. 2d 1320 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (em-
ployee discharged); Wright & Seaton, Inc. v. Prescott, 420 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
(employee resigned); Twenty Four Collection, Inc. v. Keller, 389 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 3d DCA
1980) (employee discharged); Temporarily Yours-Temporary Help Serv., Inc. v. Manpower,
Inc., 377 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (employee fired).
170. See Florida Pest Control & Chem. Co. v. Thomas, 520 So. 2d 669 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
(former employee attempted, unsuccessfully, to raise his termination by his former employer as
invalidating the covenant not to compete).
171. It is worth noting that in light of the recent amendment to § 542.33, the nature and the
circumstances surrounding the termination of the employment relationship may become relevant
in enforcement actions.
172. Braun v. Ryder Sys., Inc., 430 So. 2d 567, 568 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) ("[T]here is a
genuine issue of a material fact as to whether or not Ryder Systems, Inc. agreed to a modifica-




Before 1990, the amendments made to section 542.33 rarely entailed
significant change. The first of these was enacted in 1980 and merely
renumbered section 542.12 as 542.33 without textual amendment, as
part of a substantial overhaul of Florida's antitrust law embodied in
chapter 542.'17
In 1987, section 542.33 was amended to expand the statutory crite-
ria to include "independent contractors" among those who may en-
forceably agree with their employer to refrain from engaging in a
similar business or soliciting old customers of the employer. 7 4 In 1988
the Florida Legislature further amended section 542.33.175 This time,
lawmakers rewrote subsection (1) to clarify that by validating certain
kinds of contracts in restraint of trade, section 542.33 operated as an
exception to the rest of Florida's antitrust law.17 6 Lawmakers also
amended subsection (2)(b) to include the term "service mark" and
provide licensors of service marks with the same protection accorded
licensors of trademarks.177
Finally, in 1990 truly dramatic change came when the Legislature
enacted the most significant revision of section 542.33 since its enact-
ment in 1953.178 By the addition of the following three sentences to
subsection (2)(a) profound change was achieved:
However, the court shall not enter an injunction contrary to the
public health, safety, or welfare or in any case where the injunction
enforces an unreasonable covenant not to compete or where there is
no showing of irreparable injury. However, use of specific trade
secrets, customer lists, or direct solicitation of existing customers
shall be presumed to be an irreparable injury and may be specifically
173. Ch. 80-28, 1980 Fla. Laws 95. (In 1979, subsection (2) was redesignated (2)(a) and a
subsection (2)(b) was added that expanded the exceptions to the prohibition against contracts in
restraint of trade to allow restrictions on one who licenses the use of a particular trademark or
an identifiable business format or system. Ch. 79-43, 1979 Fla. Laws 312. This provision
brought Florida law into conformity with the laws of other states.).
174. Ch. 87-40, 1987 Fla. Laws 176. (This provision is discussed in more detail in part VB of
this Article.).
175. Ch. 88-400, 1988 Fla. Laws 2363.
176. Staff of Fla. H.R. Comm. on Com., HB 917 (1988) Staff Analysis and Economic Im-
pact Statement (final June 13, 1988) (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, Tallahas-
see, Fla.).
177. Ch. 88-400, 1988 Fla. Laws 2363. The language "trademark or service mark, and busi-
ness format or system identified by that trademark or service mark" was substituted for "trade-
mark and identifiable business format or system" in subsection (2)(b).
178. Ch. 90-216, 1990 Fla. Laws 1607.
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enjoined. In the event the seller of the goodwill of a business, or a
shareholder selling or otherwise disposing of all his shares in a
corporation breaches an agreement to refrain from carrying on or
engaging in a similar business, irreparable injury shall be
presumed. 179
B. Independent Contractor
This provision was intended to resolve confusion regarding the ap-
plicability of section 542.33 to independent contractors. Previously,
decisions in this area were frequently more "sui generis" than based
upon an identifiable legal rationale. In fact, according to one court,
the designation of an individual as an independent contractor in an
agreement containing a noncompetition covenant was deemed a suffi-
cient basis for finding the contract, as written, void as against public
policy as an illegal restraint of trade.8 0 At times, this resulted in crea-
tive attempts to invoke this characterization of a working relationship
in order to avoid the applicability of this section.
A combination of factors led to the 1987 amendment. One of these
was the increasing use of independent contractors by businesses in
roles previously filled by employees or agents.' Another important
factor was a recent Florida appellate court decision 2 that prompted a
swift and dramatic response. Lest there be any ambiguity regarding
the intended effect of the changes in section 542.33, the legislative his-
tory specifically noted that "[ilt is the sponsors' intent to legislatively
reverse the result in the Amedas case to the extent that the court held
that no independent contractor could be an agent for the purposes of
section 542.33." ' 83 Consequently, the mere characterization of some-
one as an "independent contractor" no longer bars enforcement of a
covenant not to compete. More importantly, noncompetition agree-
ments with independent contractors are now specifically authorized
and validated under Florida law.
179. Id. The impact of this additional language is discussed in part VC of this Article.
180. Schweitzer v. Seaman, 383 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
181. Staff of Fla. S. Comm. on Com., SB 166 (1987) Staff Analysis and Economic Impact
Statement (April 17, 1987) (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.).
182. Amedas, Inc. v. Brown, 505 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); Staff of Fla. H.R.
Comm. on Com., H.B. 206 (1987) Staff Analysis (final June 16, 1987) (available at Fla. Dep't of
State, Div. of Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.). This decision is discussed supra in the text accompa-
nying notes 36-38.
183. Staff of Fla. H.R. Comm. on Com., HB 206 (1987) Staff Analysis (final June 16, 1987)
(available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.).
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C. The 1990 Amendment
As discussed earlier, the momentum behind firm, almost rigid en-
forcement of noncompetition agreements had dominated the 1980s.
Following its earlier decisions in Flammer and Miller, the Florida Su-
preme Court largely sealed the fate of breaching former employees in
the 1985 Capraro case. 84 The court obliterated the requirement of
proof of irreparable injury, traditionally one of the greatest obstacles
to securing injunctions in Florida, stating:
To require that a plaintiff prove irreparable injury as a prerequisite
to injunctive relief, as petitioner urges, would, in most instances,
defeat the purpose of the plaintiff's action. Immediate injunctive
relief is the essence of such suits and oftentimes the only effectual
relief. It truly can be said in this type of litigation that relief delayed
is relief denied. For these reasons we agree with the district court that
irreparable injury should be presumed. 85
Following Capraro, courts in the latter 1980s routinely overturned
trial court decisions'86 that denied relief based upon the failure to
demonstrate irreparable injury." 7
In reaction to these developments and the manifest imbalance cre-
ated between employer and employee, the Florida Legislature enacted
legislation to help even the odds in litigation concerning noncompeti-
tion agreements. Just as Justice Ben Overton had asked it to do when
he dissented in Capraro, the Legislature added the three critical sen-
tences to section 542.33(2)(a). 188 The sponsors of this legislation were
direct in describing the desired impact of these changes:
The bill would prohibit a court from entering an injunction when the
injunction would be contrary to the public health, safety or welfare,
when the injunction enforces an unreasonable covenant to not
compete or when there is no showing of an irreparable injury. This
would overturn the decision in Capraro v. Lanier Business Products,
Inc.,... and require the party seeking injunctive relief to plead and
prove irreparable injury.
The bill would continue to allow the presumption of irreparable
184. Capraro v. Lanier Business Prod., Inc., 466 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1985).
185. Id. at 213.
186. See, e.g., Xerographics, Inc. v. Thomas, 537 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); T.K.
Communications, Inc. v. Herman, 505 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 513 So. 2d 1061
(Fla. 1987) (Relying upon the Capraro decision, the court reversed the denial of injunctive relief,
noting that "the requirements for the issuance of a temporary injunction have been met.").
187. FLA. R. Cwv. P. 1.610.
188. FLA. STAT. § 542.33(2)(a) (1990).
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injury in connection with the use of trade secrets, customer lists, or
direct solicitation of existing customers. Such injury would also
continue to be presumed in connection with the sale of the goodwill
of a business or the sale of all of a shareholder's stock in a
corporation.3 9
In addition to resurrecting the requirement of a showing of irrepa-
rable injury before the issuance of an injunction in noncompetition
agreement cases, the amendment breathes new life into the defense of
unreasonableness. As has been noted above, the clear mandate of the
case law up until this amendment was that allegations regarding un-
reasonableness were limited to consideration of the time and area res-
trictions of the covenant. This narrow review rarely resulted in the
denial of injunctive relief, regardless of the harshness or severity of
the result. A newly expanded review could have a significant effect on
enforcement actions in the future, a fact not overlooked by the Legis-
lature at the time of the adoption of these amendments: "In addition,
although courts currently examine covenants for the purpose of as-
sessing their reasonableness, the addition of language stating that the
court shall not enter an injunction which enforces an unreasonable
covenant could result in the court's reexamination of whether the cov-
enant is burdensome. . .."190
In assessing the impact of the 1990 amendment, the mandatory na-
ture of "the court shall not enter" language cannot be overlooked.
The clear import of this language undoubtedly means that in the fu-
ture, former employees will have at least two additional and powerful
avenues of defense in litigation concerning enforcement of noncompe-
tition agreements: unreasonableness of the covenant and failure to
show irreparable injury. For employers, the new change grants little.
While the statute addresses use by the former employee of specific
trade secrets, customer lists, and direct solicitation of existing custom-
ers, the amendment merely codifies existing law. Additionally, if an
employer cannot establish any of these elements, the task of proving
irreparable injury may be very difficult.
D. Aftermath
The 1990 amendment will have an enormous impact in noncompeti-
tion cases against former employees. Covenants not to compete are
189. Staff of Fla. S. Comm. on Judiciary Civil, CS for SB 2642 (1990), Staff Analysis and
Economic Impact Statement 2 (May 17, 1990) (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives,
Tallahassee, Fla.).
190. Id.
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already used in virtually every industry, through every employment
level from management to clerical, and even in hourly positions. Pres-
sures that weaken general prosperity and intensify the threat of com-
petition will increase the use of such restrictions. 19' Much of this
conflict will center on irreparable injury. Certainly as the corporate
hierarchy descends to positions of lesser authority, it becomes increas-
ingly unlikely that knowledge of trade secrets, customer lists, or the
ability to directly solicit existing customers can be attributable to em-
ployees. Thus, a natural outgrowth of the 1990 amendment may be
that future covenants will not be as widely used and may instead be
limited to key management, product development, and sales and mar-
keting personnel.' 92 In the context of more selective use, employers
may find greater support for the view that a breach of a noncompeti-
tion agreement will result in irreparable harm.
Before the 1990 amendment to section 542.33, Florida had emerged
as one of the most pro-employer states in the country regarding en-
forcement of covenants not to compete. As discussed earlier, this dis-
tinction was due in large part to the erosion of two major areas of
inquiry and consideration in these types of cases, that is, proof of ir-
reparable injury and the unreasonableness of the underlying cove-
nant. 93
191. It is highly probable that such indiscriminate usage by an employer may be a critical
issue in future enforcement proceedings as evidence of "unreasonableness." Apparently two
cases involving hourly workers-a truck driver for a beer distributor and telemarketing clerks-
who were denied jobs at competing firms motivated one of the sponsors of the 1990 amendment
to introduce the legislation. Mark Dillon, Is Florida Less Friendly To Non-Compete Contracts?,
THE Miumi REvrEw, Sept. 6, 1991, at 8A. Also, it should not be overlooked that in these reces-
sionary economic times many a prospective employee is willing to sign any document presented
in order to secure employment. This is particularly true in the case of middle managers, where
the current wave of corporate restructurings, reorganizations, and downsizings has taken a heavy
toll. Collaterally, Florida residents have long exhibited and been noted for a natural and well-
documented entrepreneurial spirit. This natural desire to start one's own business, combined
with the growing necessity for unemployed individuals to start their own business in order to
secure employment, undoubtedly will precipitate confrontation with former employers regarding
noncompetition agreements.
192. Conversely, if employers continue to require hourly employees to sign covenants not to
compete, such employers may be confronted with two rather unappealing alternatives: 1) decide
to enforce the covenant against the hourly employee, lose and risk having all such covenants
undermined, or 2) decide not to enforce and find themselves facing arguments of estoppel,
laches, and retaliatory enforcement in future enforcement proceedings.
193. The customary difficulty in proving irreparable injury, rather than being an ally of the
employee opposing enforcement of a covenant not to compete, became an asset of the employer
seeking enforcement. See, e.g., Graphic Business Sys., Inc. v. Rogge, 418 So. 2d 1084, 1086-87
(Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (The court reversed the denial of an injunction noting, particularly, that
irreparable injury may be presumed where there is a violation of a covenant not to compete and
"the practical difficulties of proving irreparable harm would tend to diminish the efficacy of
covenants not to compete, which bear the imprimatur of the legislature and the courts of Flor-
ida.").
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The 1990 amendment has clearly created a new reality. Instead of
enforcing such covenants with impunity, the amendment mandates
that judges undertake a more rigorous factual analysis of each case.
In many respects, the analysis predicated upon generally accepted eq-
uitable principles for which Justice Overton argued in his dissents in
Keller and Capraro,194 has now been achieved. Rather than just en-
force covenants, courts now must consider and weigh the protection
of legitimate business interests of the employer, the potentially unduly
oppressive effect on the former employee, 19 and the public interest
involved. These factors may or may not favor enforcement.
The single significant decision applying the 1990 amendment so far
is Hapney v. Central Garage, Inc.196 This case involved a former em-
ployer engaged in the installation, repair, and maintenance of auto air
conditioners who sought to enforce a covenant not to compete against
a former employee and his new employer. The court's lengthy opinion
began with a detailed discussion of the historical background of non-
competition agreements. The court specifically highlighted "the dis-
tinction between contracts prohibiting competition per se, which were
prima facia invalid, . . . and contracts protecting an employer from
unfair competition from a former employee who had obtained trade
secrets, or other confidential information, or special relationships
with customers during the course of his employment."' 19, Next, the
court pointed out that the Florida statute is silent on the issue of
whether, to be valid, contracts must relate to the protection of a pro-
prietary interest of the employer.198 Additionally, the court examined
whether such a requirement is implied in the statute or whether, in-
stead, the Legislature intended to authorize contracts that prohibit
competition per se. 99
194. Justice Overton's sentiments are perhaps best summarized in the following from his
dissent in Keller v. Twenty Four Collection, Inc.: "It is my belief that we should never, by our
laws or court determination, totally restrict an individual from earning a living in his or her
chosen calling, particularly when the individual is an employee not used in a management capac-
ity, except when absolutely necessary to prevent irreparable damage." 419 So. 2d 1048, 1050
(1982).
195. This line of inquiry may also include, as Justice Overton suggested in Capraro v. Lanier
Business Products, Inc., an examination of "whether termination of employment was at the
instance of the employer or employee." 466 So. 2d 212, 213 (Fla. 1985). This factor may prove
significant when considering the entire topic of unreasonableness.
196. 579 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). Hapney voluntarily terminated his employment on
July 14, 1989, and began working with a direct competitor of Gulfcoast. Gulfcoast instituted an
action to enforce the covenant not to compete on August 1, 1989. The trial court entered a
temporary injunction, and Hapney appealed.




Initially, in answering this question, the court reviewed the laws and
decisions of other states requiring proof of some legitimate protectible
business interest-not merely elimination of competition-and con-
cluded: "The rule is an expression of common sense which both pro-
tects the employer from unfair competition and recognizes the right of
an individual, in a free and competitive society, to earn an honest liv-
ing and better his status along the way. '" 200
The court also examined Florida decisions and determined that the
same general rule was an integral part of Florida law. 20' Accordingly,
the court identified the legitimate interests of the employer that may
be protected by a covenant not to compete. The court stated: "Gener-
ally, three such interests are recognized: (1) trade secrets and confi-
dential business lists, records, and information, (2) customer
goodwill, and (3) to a limited degree, extraordinary or specialized
training provided by the employer.''202 With regard to categories (1)
and (2), the court specifically referred to the 1990 amendment to sec-
tion 542.33 for endorsement. In order for specialized training to rise
to the level of a protectible interest, it must be extraordinary, which
the court defined as follows: 'Extraordinary' is that which goes be-
yond what is usual, regular, common, or customary in the industry in
which the employee is employed. ' 20 3 The court concluded that there
was no evidence in the record that Hapney's training in the pending
case rose to that level.
The court next discussed the Capraro decision and the impact of the
1990 amendment to section 542.33.204 The court also noted that the
200. Id. at 130.
201. Id. The court relied heavily on two recent decisions by the Second District Court of
Appeal: Flatley v. Forbes, 483 So. 2d 483, 485 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) ("The obvious and sole
purpose of the covenant was to exclude Forbes from competing with Flatley in Pinellas
County.") and Marshall v. Gore, 506 So. 2d 91, 92 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (The court narrowed the
scope of the injunction issued by the trial court because "the injunction protects more than
appellee's legitimate business interests.").
202. 579 So. 2d at 131.
203. Id. at 132. The court also noted that the precise degree of training that constitutes a
protectible interest "will vary from industry to industry and is a factual determination to be
made by the trial court." Id.
204. Noting that in his dissents in Keller and Capraro Justice Overton had called upon the
Florida Legislature to modify section 542.33, the court assessed the impact of the 1990 amend-
ment:
We view the sweeping impact of this amendment to be threefold. First, the presump-
tion of irreparable injury expressed in Capraro is strictly curtailed. Second, a test of
reasonableness is injected into the enforcement process because the amendment pro-
hibits the enforcement of an unreasonable covenant .... Third, the legislature has
specifically identified and segregated for special treatment covenants which protect
trade secrets and customer lists and prohibit solicitation of existing customers, all of
which are universally identified as legitimate business interests which may be pro-
19921 1139
1140 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 19:1105
1990 amendment conferred specific statutory authority on the courts
to deny injunctive relief in the case of an unreasonable covenant,
thereby invoking traditional equitable principles in order to avoid un-
fair and unjust results. Based upon that analysis, the court concluded
its decision with six specific holdings:
(1) a covenant not to compete which prohibits competition per se
violates public policy and is void; (2) a condition precedent to the
validity of a covenant not to compete entered into by an agent,
independent contractor or employee is the existence of a legitimate
business interest of the employer to be protected; (3) it is the
employer's burden to plead and prove the underlying protectible
interest; (4) trade secrets, customer lists, and the right to prevent
direct solicitation of existing customers are, per se, legitimate
business interests subject to protection; (5) other business interests,
such as, but not limited to, extraordinary training or education, may
constitute protectible interests depending upon the proof adduced;
and (6) chapter 90-216, section 1, Laws of Florida, shall apply to and
control all actions now pending or hereafter commenced. 201
This final holding was based upon the court's finding that section
542.33 is a remedial statute2°6 and accordingly should be applied retro-
spectively. 207 With its extensive examination of various issues, the
Hapney case may well prove to be a benchmark for future litigation
involving noncompetition agreements and section 542.33.
Future decisions applying the 1990 amendment will, as did the court
in Hapney, evaluate enforcement of noncompetition agreements in
light of all of the facts and circumstances of each case. 208 One of the
tected. In such cases, the proof of such an interest to be protected provides the thresh-
old for a presumption of irreparable harm on breach of the contract.
Id. at 133-34.
205. Id. at 134.
206. See Stuart L. Stein v. Miller Indus., 564 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990).
207. Id. See also Ziccardi v. Strother, 570 So. 2d 1319 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). It should be
noted that the "Comments" section of the Senate Staff Analysis accompanying the 1990 amend-
ment made the observation that "[ilt is unclear whether the provisions of the bill would apply to
covenants entered into prior to the effective date of the bill or whether the bill would apply to all
covenants breached after the effective date of the bill." Staff of Fla. S. Comm. on Judiciary
Civil, CS for SB 2642 (1990), Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statement 2 (May 17, 1990)
(available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.). In contrast, the House
Staff Analysis to the 1988 amendment described § 542.33 as 'remedial in nature, therefore, the
bill would most likely be applied retroactively ...." Staff of Fla. H.R. Comm. on Com., HB
917 (1988) Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statement 3 (final June 13, 1988) (available at
Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.). This latter view is more persuasive.
208. In certain respects, this will constitute a revival of the approach outlined in American
Building Maintenance Co. v. Fogelman, 167 So. 2d 791, 792 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964), which advo-
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first steps in the process will be a determination of the reasonableness
of the covenant, which will include "a balancing test to weigh the em-
ployer's interest in preventing the competition against the oppressive
effect on the employee."0
Implementing a balancing test, will, of necessity, encompass consid-
eration of a myriad of issues. These include: the time and geographic
area of the restriction; the nature of the business and whether it in-
volves the public health, safety, or welfare; any evidence of duress,
economic or otherwise, associated with the execution of the covenant;
any additional consideration for the covenant such as a bond, stock,
equity, a multi-year contract; whether the employee holds a manage-
ment position or not; the nature and scope of the employee's duties
and responsibilities; the length of the employee's service; the employ-
ee's knowledge of confidential trade secrets or customer lists; any in-
vestment by the employer in specialized and extraordinary training
and education of the employee; any unique skills possessed by the em-
ployee, particularly any that relate to the public health, safety or wel-
fare; any special circumstances relating to the employee's employment
with the employer such as recent relocation, the foregoing of other
employment opportunities or reliance on promises by the employer;
any breach of promise or agreement by the employee or employer;
whether the termination of employment was voluntary or involuntary
and with or without cause; an oppressive and harsh impact on the
employee; the ability of the employee to secure other employment;
and, finally, any unusual facts or circumstances relating to the em-
ployment relationship or its termination. 210 No listing can be exhaus-
cated a two-step process: first, a determination regarding the reasonableness of the agreement
per se, and second, a determination concerning the reasonableness of the agreement as applied in
the instant case. In a broader sense, it harkens to the exercise of judicial discretion outlined in
Cordis Corp. v. Prooslin, 482 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986):
In exercising its discretion, the court is guided by established rules and principles of
equity jurisprudence, in view of the particular facts presented in the case .... The
trial court must use a balancing-type approach, balancing the possible beneficial re-
sults on the one hand with the possible detrimental results on the other, . . and the
threatened hardships associated with the issuance or denial of the injunction with the
degree of likelihood of success on the merits.
Id. at 491 (citations omitted).
209. Miller Mechanical, Inc. v. Ruth, 300 So. 2d 11, 12 (Fla. 1974). This will be a vindica-
tion of the position expressed by Judge Wentworth in her dissent in Fla. Pest Control & Chemi-
cal Co. v. Thomas, 520 So. 2d 669 (Fla. Ist DCA 1988), where she railed at the employer's
attempt, in that case successfully, to obtain a broader injunctive order which, in effect, "for-
bid[s] such employment in any capacity, without regard to the employee's performance of any
functions having competitive impact on employer's business." Id. at 672.
210. This might include sexual or racial harassment of the employee by the employer or
similar claims that the employer created a hostile work environment that caused the employee to
1992] 1141
1142 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITYLA WREVIEW [Vol. 19:1105
tive. Ultimately, the range of circumstances can be limited only by the
range of human endeavor and the creativity of counsel representing
the former employer or employee in an enforcement action.
Beyond a mere listing of the factors to be considered in enforce-
ment actions involving covenants not to compete, it is possible to con-
struct a methodology for resolving such issues. This methodology will
of necessity involve, among other considerations, attention to the cat-
egory of the position held by the former employee and the industry
involved. Generally, in order for a former employer to prevail in en-
forcing a covenant not to compete, the former employer must prove
that the threatened injury it faces outweighs any possible harm to the
former employee. Otherwise, the covenant not to compete is unrea-
sonable and therefore unenforceable.
Beyond the conclusive statutory presumption of irreparable harm
set forth in the 1990 amendment, there should be a rebuttable pre-
sumption of irreparable harm in cases involving a former employee at
the management level and above. This category of employees is typi-
cally privy to company trade secrets, business strategies, and customer
information.
Conversely, there should be a presumption, again rebuttable,
against irreparable harm in the case of former employees below the
management level. The vast majority of these employees lack any
knowledge of company trade or business secrets, and the awareness of
customer information is usually only in the most general sense. Ab-
sent a showing by the former employer of a significant investment in
training or developing the employee, which must be significant and
extraordinary-not merely what is standard and customary in the in-
dustry-the presumption against irreparable harm would prevail. The
former employer may experience greater success in overcoming this
presumption in highly specialized and technical industries.
The facts and circumstances surrounding the termination of the em-
ployment relationship should also be examined. As a matter of pure
equity, an employer who has wrongfully terminated the employee
should not be able to enforce a covenant not to compete against the
employee. Similarly, in cases where the former employee-regardless
of level-is terminated without cause, there should be a rebuttable
presumption against irreparable harm on the part of the former em-
resign. In such a manner, the employee would, in effect, be invoking the classic equitable de-
fense of "unclean hands" to an enforcement action by the former employer, or, as Justice Over-
ton observed: "[Hie who seeks equity must do equity." Keller v. Twenty Four Hour Collection,
Inc., 419 So. 2d 1048, 1050 (1982).
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ployer. This can be established in much the same way that claims for
unemployment compensation are validated. This presumption should
only be overcome with compelling evidence of specific tangible con-
sideration tendered for such purpose and received as part of the termi-
nation. Otherwise, the former employer should be precluded from
enforcing such a covenant. 21' It seems patently unreasonable for an
employer to terminate an employee without cause and, at the same
time, prevent the employee from securing gainful employment.
In cases where the former employee leaves voluntarily, the courts
should exercise appropriate judicial review of the facts and circum-
stances of each case, weighing the interests of the employer and em-
ployee, and considering the public interest. The result often may be
judicial construction of an appropriate limitation on the activities of
the former employee with the new employer, which protects the legiti-
mate business interests of the former employer. This only seems just
and reasonable in light of the current economic forces. 21 2
VI. CONCLUSION
With the 1990 amendment to section 542.33, a requiem of sorts for
noncompete agreements may be heard. These agreements will con-
tinue to be part of business and commerce, but their use and enforce-
ment probably will be more selective and limited. A rigid pattern of
enforcement by courts in the mid-1980s obviously has been altered by
the 1990 amendment. 213 In this new era, the courts' challenge will be
to address the three vital interests at stake in this area-the personal
interest in practicing one's trade or profession and earning a living,
the employer's interest in protecting the integrity and vitality of its
211. The former employer would, of course, still be able to avail itself of the copyright and
trademark protections. In addition, if appropriate and the facts warranted, the former employer
could pursue an action for tortious interference with business opportunity.
212. This approach has broad support generally by the courts of other jurisdictions that have
applied either the "blue pencil rule" or complete modification to unreasonable covenants not to
compete. This has been done based on the general concept that flexibility promotes equity. DON-
ALD J. APPELUND & CLARENCE E. ERIKSEN, EMPLOYEE NONCOMPETITION LAW § 8.01 (1991).
213. How much of this momentum to stem such rigid enforcement and interject a degree of
judicial discretion is due to economic forces, as opposed to the evolution of public policy opin-
ion regarding such widespread use of covenants not to compete, is a matter of conjecture, but
the impact of the current recessionary atmosphere cannot be discounted. In certain respects, the
passage of the 1990 amendment represents the convergence of three factors: a growing recogni-
tion that Florida law regarding noncompetition agreements was too rigid, the effects of the cur-
rent recession and the inequality of bargaining power for employers and employees, and the
desire to have Florida law on the subject be more in the mainstream of other jurisdictions.
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business franchise, and the public interest in seeing that the two are
properly balanced. In adopting the 1990 amendment to section
542.33, the Florida Legislature sought to restore some semblance of
fairness to an area of law that had become decidedly one-sided. Be-
cause section 542.33 is in derogation of the common law abhorrence
of restraints on trade, the new criteria for enforcement will require
employers to demonstrate the need to protect a legitimate business in-
terest and not merely suppress competition. Courts that have become
accustomed to rigidly enforcing noncompetition agreements will have
to reorient their thinking regarding such agreements. These courts will
have to reexamine covenants not to compete in the light in which they
were originally viewed-as attempts to restrain trade, which should be
read, interpreted, and enforced narrowly.214
Accordingly, in many respects, the 1990 amendment marks a return
of section 542.33 to its roots. With its enactment, the Legislature has
radically changed the rules regarding noncompetition agreements in
Florida and has turned back the clock. The more recent all-or-nothing
approach to enforcement has been abrogated. Instead, the clear man-
date from the Legislature is that the courts must now engage in the
serious exercise of judicial development of sound criteria for enforce-
ment. 215 Whole areas that were formerly foreclosed from considera-
tion and deemed irrelevant, such as proving irreparable injury;
considerations of public health, safety, or welfare; and the general un-
reasonableness of the covenant are now viable.
It is hoped that, in fulfilling this mandate, the courts will be mind-
ful of the sound advice provided by the Florida Supreme Court in
Capelouto v. Orkin Exterminating Co.: "The restrictive provisions of
such contracts wili generally be enforced in such a way as to protect
the legitimate interests of the employer without doing harm to the
public interest, and without inflicting an unduly harsh or oppressive
result on the employee. ' 216 The proof of this proposition will be
found in the courts and how they administer the new order inaugu-
rated by the 1990 amendment.
214. This should not be too difficult for most trial courts that have exhibited a historical
reluctance to impose such sanctions, even in the face of repeated appellate reversals calling for
more stringent enforcement.
215. As contrasted with the short-hand approach of the 1980s, some suggested guidelines for
this development are set forth supra in part VD of this Article.
216. 183 So. 2d 532, 534 (1966).
